Game-playing and understanding decision-making within legal frameworks: the use of computerised simulation by Harding, Christopher et al.
GAME PLAYING AND UNDERSTANDING DECISION-MAKING WITHIN LEGAL FRAMEWORKS: THE USE OF COMPUTERISED SIMULATION

Christopher Harding,* Simon Garrett** and Shisheng Wang***


*Department of Law and Criminology, Aberystwyth University
**Aispire Consulting Ltd






The use of hypothetical factual situations to explore and discuss the way in which ‘real life’ events and problems occur and develop is an established and valuable predictive method for understanding such events and testing the resolution of problems. In so far as such simulation employs hypothetical events and itineraries of action as a way of arriving at conclusions and solutions it may be described as a kind of game playing and the discussion in this paper first explore the value of simulation exercises in legal and other contexts. Then, taking the example of a simulation based upon a board game involving strategies and risks arising in the legal regulation of business cartels, it reports on the testing of a more powerful computerised version of the board game. Examining the outcome of a large number of moves around the game board, this served as a pilot study for considering the value of further development of such a computational model for possible application in research, educational and training contexts.  






1.	Summary: use of the hypothetical

An understanding of how law works in practice and how legal analysis and argument is used in ‘real life’ situations may be gained through the exploration of hypothetical factual situations and different routes or itineraries of decision-making (strategies and their outcomes) within those hypothetical contexts. This model has been widely employed for example for purposes of legal education in using the ‘problem question’ method of exploring the application of legal rules in imagined fact situations. This may be regarded as a kind of game-playing. As a variant of this, the project described here develops the idea of a board game, and then a more sophisticated computer simulation of that game,​[1]​ in relation to a particular context of policy and law – the regulation of business cartels. 

This project aims eventually to bring together a legal and economics based expertise in identifying the range of decisions and risks in the context of cartel control with the expertise in developing a computer programme which could have a number of professional and educational applications (especially in the context of higher education courses, professional training, continuing professional development, business decision-making, or policy-making in a number of contexts).   


2.	Game playing and understanding decision-making in legal contexts: some theory and practice

Empirical versus predictive accounts

A main objective of this kind of game-playing analysis is to probe the relation between the theory and practice of law. Or, to put the matter another way, legal theory may be used to put forward a normative design or blue-print, a prescriptive scheme of rules and procedures which may be used to govern certain ‘real life’ situations, while legal practice describes the actual operation – the implementation and enforcement – of those norms. It is a commonplace observation that there may well in the outcome be a gap or difference between the two, the rules ‘on paper’ and the application of the rules,​[2]​ and the reasons for and the extent of such differences are a major concern of 
policy-makers and lawyers, and so a subject for critical legal enquiry and scholarship. How (well) does the law work ?

This question may be answered via a number of research methods, but perhaps two main models may be identified. 

First, there is the empirical approach: collect data on the actuality of rule application. This is a posteriori knowledge and understanding, based upon experience or observation of actual historical events. Such empirical evidence can be used in achieving an explanation and understanding of real life activity since it demonstrates a combination of circumstance and outcome which cannot be doubted. Sometimes such data is presented as ‘case studies’. In a legal context, this line of enquiry results in a statement of precedential value, an example of an outcome when rules are applied to an actual, historical set of facts, and is the basis of the so-called ‘case law’ method. But as a method of achieving explanation and understanding it has clear limitations. First, being based on external observation and recording of certain events, it describes the external appearance of the action, but not necessarily the internal aspects, in particular what was undoubtedly in the actors’ minds at the time of the events in question. Secondly, even as an account of externalities, it is subject to a certain degree of interpretation and analysis on the part of the ex post facto observer (and this may be more or less conscious, a matter of openly acknowledged argument or of subliminal cultural influences). Thirdly, for practical and evidential reasons empirical observation is naturally limited to a certain number of instances, and generalisation from a limited sample may be contestable and controversial. Ultimately, empirical reporting may then be subject to the charge of being no more than anecdotal in its value. Fourthly, it is a method that is largely dependent on historical happenstance – only when particular fact situations occur or are observable in the real world, can any empirical reporting take place. It is possible to imagine certain fact situations, yet not find any actual occurrences to use as evidence. 

Secondly, there is the predictive approach, For the above reasons it may be tempting for policy and law makers to move on from a limited amount of the empirically known and anticipate actuality by asking and testing a ‘what if ?’ line of reasoning – to imagine (or to fictionalise, act out, or play a game) as a way of predicting outcomes on the basis of analogy from existing real life situations. Such a predictive approach may employ role-playing and simulation, hypothetical and typical factual narratives, imagined realities, and so game-playing. In a legal context, the second approach, being predictive rather than responsive, may investigate in a more systematic and comprehensive way such questions as normative structure, the variability of chance, risk and circumstance, and strategic decision-making, and in a way that is not dependent on the happenstance of historical circumstance. Thus, playing the game rather than digging out history may prove to be a powerful tool of analysis. In legal terms this method is embodied in a legislative approach which works out solutions and standards for the future by relying on assumption and generalisation, so converting a certain but limited body of experience into the typical.





Excursus: thoughts on the empirical

Before proceeding to explore in more detail the predictive, game-playing approach, it may be worthwhile to insert a small excursus on anecdote and narrative in relation to empirically gathered evidence.

Although in a research context, the term ‘anecdote’ has a critical implication of indirect report and limited sample, Daniel Kahneman has argued that there is a certain power of anecdotal evidence in everyday decision-making. As a matter of choice theory, it may be shown how models of choice used in various contexts may be contingent on accounts or anecdotes that frame or influence an individual’s choice to do x or y. Focusing on the impact of rare events on future decision-making, Kahneman has commented: 

‘My current view of decision weights has been strongly influenced by recent research on the role of emotions and vividness in decision-making …. Emotions and vividness influence fluency, availability, and judgments of probability – and thus account for our excessive response for the few rare events that we do not ignore.’​[3]​ 

Kahneman discusses the matter in terms of vivid outcomes and vivid probabilities in order to examine the hypothesis that people (a) overestimate the probabilities of unlikely events and (b) overweight unlikely events in their decisions.​[4]​ For purposes of argument, and impact on the reader and listener, anecdotal accounts may have a significance despite the tendency of researchers to downgrade the role of anecdote. 







Predictive and hypothetical accounts as game playing

To return now to the predictive methodology: here a certain limited body of experience and actual observation can be used as a springboard for an imagined or hypothetical scenario, or a number of alternative fact situations, and playing out action in such a scenario. The outcomes of such gaming or role playing may then be used, for instance, in assessing the likely application of rules or calculating the probability of desired or undesired situations, while participation in the role-playing may provide some insight into the internal motivations and reasoning processes of real life actors. The game then becomes an important opportunity for study and learning and so a powerful tool in education and research. As the American anthropologist Edward T Hall argued in a classic text of the 1970s:

‘The failure to understand the significance of play  in maturing human beings has had incalculable consequences, because play is not only crucial to learning but (unlike other drives) is its own reward.’​[5]​

Far from being a childish version of the learning process, the ‘let’s pretend’ approach may prove a dynamic and productive means of understanding real life situations and problems – ‘half of the time we’d broaden our minds more in the pool hall than we did in the school hall’.​[6]​
 
It may be helpful at this point just to note some of the contexts in which such game-playing ‘hypotheticals’ may be used. 

	A first context which readily comes to mind is the use of ‘problem questions’ in legal education and training, working through imagined factual narratives to test the way in which rules may be applied to a range of factual situations, so enabling some evaluations of the fitness for purpose of the rules. This may be of value in a number of socio-legal contexts: substantive law, evidence, procedure, justice and policy. 
	A second, rather different context is criminological and psychological profiling. This method, which is increasingly important in criminal investigations, employs an ‘expert’ narrative of, for instance, delinquent, emotional or irrational behaviour to inform investigators of the kind of person who should be sought in relation to the commission of an actual crime.​[7]​ So for example: this is the typical imagined behaviour of a serial killer, which can then be matched against actual potential suspects. 
	A third example is that of ‘the rational actor’, as an imagined construct of behaviour in certain contexts. For instance, in relation to business activity, companies may be assumed to be rational profit-making actors, basing decisions on pure economic calculation, and as non-human actors not subject to emotional influence or other irrational factors.​[8]​ This is the favoured assumption of econometric modelling and prediction, which may be used for instance to work out ‘optimal’ penalties or sanctions which will, on such a view, inevitably guide and determine business decision-making. 
	Finally, there is the context of political strategy, and the examination of different moves towards certain political goals. In this context, political analysts may employ ‘war games’, ‘diplomatic games’ and ‘election games’ to predict real life outcomes.​[9]​ 

In any of the above contexts, a range of different hypothetical narrative forms may be employed to enact and test role-playing. For example:

	A seminar simulation would provide a relatively simple and basic form, whereby members of a discussion group follow and discuss a written narrative of events, or in a more developed form each member assumes a representative role of a fictional person within the narrative (and the seminar then turns into a simple dramatization).​[10]​ 
	Dramatisations may be more or less sophisticated, allowing individuals as play actors to inhabit an imagined role and act out a scripted narrative, as for instance in a stage or filmed drama of criminal investigation or legal process. Similarly, written fiction can enable its author to explore a hypothetical situation and its possible outcomes in a fictional written narrative – so that crime fiction, for example, could be viewed as a ‘criminological imagining’.​[11]​ 
	The use of the ‘prisoner’s dilemma’ exercise in game theory is another example of an imagined and predictive working through of a number of possible narratives: will my criminal partner X, being questioned now separately, decide to provide incriminating evidence in return for an offered advantage, or should I do the same now in the hope of gaining that advantage for myself ? This game-playing involves the prediction and comparison of a number of different outcomes and risks, in a situation of limited knowledge, involving the player in a rational gambler’s role.​[12]​ 
	Another format is the board game, typically involving a repetitive itinerary of activity, and encounter with different risks and opportunities in a way that simulates historical chance (usually by the throw of a dice). In its traditional form, the board game has some natural limits, in the number of moves that may be made around the board (for instance, 50 per circuit) and the number of risks and opportunities associated with stages of play or squares on the board (for instance, the chance of one out of twenty per square). A computer simulation of a board game can move beyond this quantitative limitation, by easily multiplying the number of moves and encounters with risks and opportunities, and in this way becomes a more powerful predictive tool. 

It is the format of the board game and its development as a computer simulation that is used here in the context of the regulation of business cartels.  

	
3.	Anti-cartel enforcement game playing

Cartels are an important feature of modern business. They are set up when suppliers of particular goods or services group together and decide not to compete with each other in the normal way, for instance by agreeing to charge the same prices, sharing markets between themselves, limiting their output or rigging bids for major contracts. Suppliers may do this in order to protect their own trading position and maximise their profits, but such anticompetitive practices are seen to be to the detriment of consumers, who then pay higher prices and have less choice on the market.​[13]​ The American Department of Justice calculates that a typical price fixing cartel will raise prices for consumers by about ten per cent above the normal competitive price. In certain markets the ‘supra-competitive’ profit made by cartels may amount to billions of dollars or euros.​[14]​ Such cartels are now outlawed in many legal systems and tough measures of control are used by competition authorities, who are charged with the investigation, prosecution and imposition of penalties on companies who engage in cartels. Thus, over the past 30 years the legal regulation of business cartels has developed into a globally significant enforcement industry, comprising increasingly sophisticated regulatory intervention, business decision-making and legal strategy.​[15]​ 

The difficulties in investigating and proving secretive and collusive anti-competitive action (such as, typically, price fixing and market sharing) in diverse markets have led to the development of different ‘cartel busting’ strategies, such as surprise inspections (‘dawn raids’), covert surveillance (if legally allowed), and perhaps most significantly the ‘carrot and stick’ prisoner’s dilemma strategy embodied in leniency programmes, offering legal immunity to whistle blowers who are the first to provide crucial evidence to enforcement authorities.​[16]​ Competition authorities therefore seek to persuade individual companies to blow the whistle on cartels and provide crucial evidence of their existence. Typically they do so by promising leniency, or immunity from fines and prison terms, for the first company or company employee to come forward with evidence,​[17]​ while imposing severe sanctions on the other members of the exposed cartel. Membership of a cartel then becomes a gamble, weighing the prospect of perhaps huge illegal profit against the risk that another member of the cartel may cheat on the rest, report the cartel, and thereby make a big economic gain at their expense. Cartels are therefore a temptation and a risk - whether to join in the first place, how long to remain a member, whether to blow the whistle, or whether to stay, gambling that the cartel will never be busted.

These legal developments have complicated business decision-making, adding legal risks to business risks in the calculus of market strategies. At the same time this has brought about an upward spiral of both enforcement and also business delinquency: an escalation of legal competences, sanctions and legal defence on the one side, and an increasingly determined and sophisticated resort to subterfuge and obstructive strategies on the other side.​[18]​ In game theory terms, business cartel activity and its legal control have become a fertile site for business planning and legal intervention, in effect a complex regulatory battleground.

One way of beginning to understand and master the complexity of decision-making in this context is to simulate for predictive purposes ‘real life’ scenarios by constructing typical fictional narratives of marketplace and legal action in ‘hypotheticals’. As explained above, a very basic prototype for exploring the dynamic of such strategic decision-making is the conventional board game, based upon an itinerary of imagined real life action which requires strategic choice in order to navigate risks and variables (e.g Monopoly, Risk, Diplomacy), or, put another way, importing the pure strategies of the game of chess into simulated real life contexts. 

As stated above, a board game is naturally limited in the number and range of decisions and variables that may be encountered. However, a computerised simulation would enable a much greater range of decisions and variables to be incorporated into the play, so allowing for a much faster and richer testing of decisions and their outcomes. Such a simulation could model, at very high speed, repeated playings of a simple board game, with each run being based on different rules. The aim is to predict outcomes in the regulation of cartels (whether from the standpoint of a regulator or a business) throughout a business cycle, involving elements of strategic decision taking, risk and chance.


4.	The board game: cartel busting​[19]​

Cartel busting is a game of business strategy and business risk, a mixture of calculation and chance. Why do companies risk big fines and business executives risk going to jail ? Perhaps because cartels are exciting and can make a lot of money !

This is a game that would be categorised as competitive rather than collaborative, something which would be true of most board games: ‘players are ‘required to form strategies that directly oppose the other players in the game. The goals of the players are diametrically opposed’.​[20]​ It would be an interesting further question to explore a collaborative or co-operative version of the game, which could also fit into an educational or ethical agenda.​[21]​


The rules of the game

A game for between 4 and 8 players.  

Each player is a competing corporate supplier of goods or services who may during the course of play enter up to five of the ten markets in the game. Each player joins a market of choice at their first turn, and may then enter an extra market of choice in any subsequent turn, up to a maximum of five markets for any one player at any one time. A player may choose to leave one market at any turn but may not both enter and leave markets in a single turn. Any gains or losses achieved by a player on moving around the board must be multiplied by the number of markets in which the player is currently operating. Players must indicate the markets in which they are operating by hanging the appropriate market banners over their card decks. Once in a particular market, a player may choose to join the cartel in that market when landing on a join cartel square, and then operates as a cartelist rather than competitor for purposes of profits and risks. When a cartel has been busted in a particular market, that market will be put out of play. If the point is reached when cartels have been busted in all ten markets, the game will end.
 
The ten markets are : pharmaceuticals; fine glassware; computer games; wood burning stoves; fee-paying schools; postal and courier services; recruitment agencies; tourist assistance; recycling of metal waste and scrap; guns and ammunition.

Object : to finish the game with the highest business value, i.e. amount in financial reserve. Some players may go out of business during the course of play, if and as soon as their financial reserve goes into debit. Each player starts the game with 50 million in reserve.

Each player moves around the board in turn, by throw of the dice. Order of play is determined at the start by the highest throw of the dice, and then each player clockwise around the table. The players’ route around the board consists of fifty squares, comprising : an enter market square ; competitor risk squares; cartelist risk squares; join cartel option squares; and an annual profit announcement square at the end of each circuit of the board.

Players proceed around the board in one of four modes : competitor mode, cartelist mode, busted cartelist mode, or whistleblower mode.






Each player starts the game as a competitor. This is the normal and lawful mode of business. As a competitor, the player collects an annual profit of 25 million on completion of each circuit of the board. When landing on a competitor risk square, a competitor must take a competitor risk card from the top of the competitor chance pile. The majority of these cards are either a gain or loss cards. Payments are collected or made immediately and the card replaced at the bottom of the pile. Payments either to be received or handed over are multiplied by the number of markets in which that player is operating. When landing on a join cartel option square a competitor may choose to join the cartel in one of the markets in which that player is operating and move into cartelist mode (see below). 






A player in competitor mode may join a cartel in any one market in which that player is operating when landing on a join cartel option square. As a cartel member the player will then collect an annual profit of 50 million when completing a round of the board. On joining a cartel the player must indicate membership of that cartel to the other players.

When landing on a cartelist risk square, a player in cartelist mode must take a cartelist risk card from the top of the cartelist chance pile. The majority of these cards are gain or loss cards. Any payment to be received or handed over is multiplied by, first, the number of cartels that player has joined, and then by the number of players in any one of the cartels to which that player belongs as nominated by that player (which should be that with largest membership to maximise the gain, or the lowest membership to minimise the loss). Thus, suppose the payment is 10 million, and the player belongs to three cartels, and the highest membership in any of these cartels is four, while the lowest membership is two. Then the multiplication would be : 10 x 3  = 30 x 4 = 120 million, to maximise a gain or payment to that player. The multiplication would be 10 x 3 = 30 x 2 = 60 million to minimise a loss or payment for that player.

There is a small number of cartelist risk wild cards. Such a card is a Go for Leniency card which must be used at that turn or not at all, and then returned to the bottom of the pile. If played, the Go for Leniency card places the player using it immediately in Whistleblower mode, which enables that player to report any one of the cartels of which the player is a member to the Competition Authority, with the consequence that the cartel is busted (see below). Generally speaking, a whistleblower has more to gain from busting a cartel with a larger number of participants, but it will be a matter of judgment whether or not to use the card.


Corporate social responsibility (CSR)






If (a) a competitor uses a report cartel card or (b) a cartelist uses a go for leniency card, the cartel in the market in question is busted. All cartel members (except a whistle blower) must then go immediately to the Competition Authority’s Waiting Room. The cartelists must remain in the Waiting Room until a throw of six enables them to leave. On leaving the departing player must immediately pay a fine amounting to 50% of that player’s financial reserve at that point of play. For every turn when a busted cartelist throws less than six on the dice, a card must be taken from the top of the busted cartelist chance pile. These busted cartelist risk cards provide for either a reduction or an increase in the amount of the fine eventually paid on leaving the Waiting Room, but these amounts are paid or received immediately upon the card being taken.

A player who holds 6 CSR cards may leave the Waiting Room at the next turn, with a 50% fine reduction, by handing over the 6 CSR cards to the Competition Authority.











5.	What the game explores

A number of aspects of real life involvement in business cartels may be explored and tested through playing the game. For instance, choosing to play either as a competitor or a cartelist when offered the opportunity to join a cartel explores the extent of an innate, instinctive and natural compliance with rules. Through each player’s choice to do, or not to do the ‘right thing’, some sense may be gained of normativity as a default characteristic of human behaviour. To what extent will a player elect to play as a lawful competitor, whatever the perceived gains and risks of exercising that choice ? Conversely, the play may also explore the willingness to break rules in order to gain an advantage, and this is probed in the context of a limited and relative knowledge, and thus calculation of risk.

The game can also be used to explore strategic decision-making in a context of crisis or heightened risk, and in some ways replicates the prisoner’s dilemma. The risks in this situation are not only business risks, but also legal enforcement risks. On the one hand, this will be a contemplation of the risk of a non-cartelist competitor or an injured third party reporting the existence of the cartel, and on the other hand in the context of a leniency programme it is the risk of co-conspirator or fellow cartelist reporting. In this second situation, there is probably a higher level of risk, since there is a higher probability of convincing evidence in relation to a cartel if the matter is reported by a member of the cartel, from the inside.

Following from the above, it may be possible to identify certain types of player or business actor:

Type A: the normative actor (the compliant, rule-abiding actor who plays as a lawful competitor).

Type B: the rational actor (the self-serving, profit-motivated actor who plays as a rule-breaking and risk-taking cartelist).

Type C: the strategic actor (the adaptable, rule-exploitative actor, who plays as a manipulative whistle blower in reporting the existence of the cartel for business advantage).      






The purpose of the computational simulation — at least in this first instance — was two-fold: (a) to act as an initial fact-finding exercise, to help investigate the usefulness (or otherwise) of a computer simulation as a tool for policy makers and legislators; and (b) if the simulation were found to be potentially valuable, to help uncover the technical requirements for a next-stage simulation, so that such a simulation might be a more detailed and more accurate model of reality. 

It should be noted that the purpose of the simulation is not to help enforce the law by using modelling as evidence of violation, as was the case in Reichenauer’s study,​[22]​ rather it is to model the effects and dynamics of the law itself.

In principle, writing a computer simulation of a game is relatively simple because most if not all games have well-established rules, states, and defined start and termination conditions, which are amenable for conversion to a computer programme. Building a simple simulation would have been useful in itself, since a computerised version of the game can be run to completion many times a second, and multiple start conditions can be explored very quickly. 






The simulation code was written in the Java computing language. The code modelled:

a.	the board game via the creation of functional units representing the game board itself (an abstracted world); 
b.	the game cards (abstracted events that can affect players); 
c.	a simple rule-following, artificial intelligence agent (player) acting on three strategies, namely (i) pursuing cartel activity, which encompasses the rational and strategic actors from Section 4; (ii) pursuing free-market activity, and (iii) a random choice of either activity to act as a control; 
d.	a game engine (the machine code that moved the players around the board and managed card-taking events etc), and computer code to record the results of the game for later analysis. 

The initial conditions were as follows:

	6 players, 2 of who are cartelists, 2 competitors, and 2 playing in ‘balance’,i.e based on their current money will either try to join a cartel if losing money or leave a cartel when they have made a profit and to avoid being busted
	All players begin with 50 credits (an abstract monetary sum)
	Any player who acts as a ‘whistle blower’ (they report a cartel) receives a bonus of 20 credits.
	A competitor’s annual profit is 25 credits.
	A cartelist’s annual profit is 50 credits.
	No game may last longer than 10,000 moves.

The game was run with these initial conditions (see Figure 1 in the Results section), but the initial conditions for each ‘run’ (simulated game) of the simulation could be, and were, altered programmatically over a number of runs. 

Alterable conditions include the amount of reward for cartel behaviour (relative to legal competitive behaviour), the penalty for being caught engaging in cartel behaviour, and the amount of cartel behaviour relative to the number of competitors. Some examples are shown in the Results section, below.

Care was taken to ensure the default settings for the computer simulation matched the board by converting all game cards into comma-separated computer files that listed the financial benefit or penalty of each card, and by similarly converting the game board, and using a typical number of players for a board game (generally six plays, but, some experiments varied between two and six players). It was verified that the results from this simulation matched those obtained by playing the physical board game.

Moreover, it was important to establish that the game (whether the board game or computer simulation) was a rough analogue of what is known of the real world. This proved to be a rather subjective activity, and indeed the game was designed at this stage with didactic legal rather than economic ends in mind, nevertheless there does seem to be a large enough overlap between the game and reality to make the results interesting.
 





The results, which show the degree of repeatability, the difference in results for different player strategies, the differences causes by different initial conditions and the analogues with reality, were as follows:






The graph in Fig. 1 shows the results from 1,000 games, with each marker plotted at the number of moves at which the game ended and the cash reserves (or debt) for the remaining participants. Three kinds of points are plotted: (i) competitors, who are not engaged in cartel activity; (ii) cartelists, who are engaged in cartel activity, and (iii) busted cartelists, who were in a cartel but whose cartel activities were reported/discovered and who have had to pay the financial cost of being discovered.

The graph shows competitors (shows as red squares) are at a disadvantage, always losing money when cartel activity is present. Busted cartelists also fail to make profit when cartel activity remains. If the game is short (less than 1,000 moves) busted cartelists suffer more than competitors; but they are able to recover if the game lasts longer, and perform consistently better than competitors after 2,500 moves or so. 


















Although this is a simple simulation, there is an unexpected bifurcation in the plot results, which can be understood by adjusting the number of cartelists. Figure 3 shows how each ‘arm’ of the cartelist graph is related to a number of cartelists. When there is only one cartelist, there is no effective cartel, hence the reward is much lower.






9.	Implications and further work

Given the interesting and suggestive outcomes of this proof-of-concept simulation of the game, the next stage of the research would be to develop a fuller and more accurate economic and legal model of cartel and non-cartel activity, based on current and historical legal and economic settings, and to build a computer simulation that can reproduce more of the behaviour that is actually observed. This will require a fully-funded project, with input from both Law and Economics researchers. But it is possible already to sketch out a fuller and richer itinerary of strategic options and risks within the board game which could then be fed into the simulation. For instance, it is possible to imagine a more detailed and complex process of decision-making in relation to both remaining silent or talking to regulators, once a cartel has been bust. A strategy of silence could be based on either a calculation that nothing much will happen or be proven,​[23]​ or a determined resistance (hide or destroy evidence, challenge the evidence). A strategy of talking could be based on a policy of saying the minimum to gain immunity or a discount in the fine, or saying as much as possible to gain extra points (as in the US system of ‘amnesty plus’).​[24]​ There is a limited amount of evidence that actual cartelist decisions are motivated by such strategies, and this could be further inserted into both the board game and the computational simulation.
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